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Abstract
“Offsetting” habitat destruction has widespread appeal as an instrument for
balancing economic growth with biodiversity conservation. Requiring propo-
nents to pay the nontrivial costs of habitat loss encourages sensitive plan-
ning approaches. Offsetting, biobanking, and biodiverse carbon sequestration
schemes will play an important role in conserving biodiversity under increas-
ing human pressures. However, untenable assumptions in existing schemes
are undermining their benefits. Policies that allow habitat destruction to be
offset by the protection of existing habitat are guaranteed to result in further
loss of biodiversity. Similarly, schemes that allow trading the immediate loss of
existing habitat for restoration projects that promise future habitat will, at best,
result in time lags in the availability of habitat that increases extinction risks, or
at worst, fail to achieve the offset at all. We detail concerns about existing ap-
proaches and describe how offsetting and trading policies can be improved to
provide genuine benefits for biodiversity. Due to uncertainties about the way
in which restored vegetation matures, we propose that the biodiversity bank
should be a savings bank. Accrued biodiversity values should be demonstrated
before they can be used to offset biodiversity losses. We provide recommenda-
tions about how this could be achieved in practice.
Introduction
Biobanking and vegetation offset approaches are now
widely applied in an attempt to halt ongoing reduction
in vegetation cover in already heavily altered landscapes
(Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005). Offsetting approaches have
been developed that aim to incorporate ecological prin-
ciples, though policy and technical issues are yet to be
resolved. The use of offsets to mitigate damage to bio-
diversity through vegetation clearance (ten Kate et al.
2004; Blundell 2006) is flawed if it allows clearance to
be offset by protection of existing ecological assets. This
will reduce the amount of habitat in a landscape, rather
than lead to “net gain” or “no net loss” that is the ob-
jective of such schemes (e.g., Wetland trading in USA
[Reppert 1992]; Biobanking [Department of Environ-
ment and Conservation 2005]; and Net-gain [Victorian
Government 2002] policies in Australia). Furthermore,
the way that ecological concepts are incorporated into
such policies will be crucial if they are to succeed in main-
taining and improving biodiversity throughout the land-
scape (e.g., the role of habitat connectivity, area and qual-
ity in mediating metapopulation persistence (Hodgson
et al. 2009), the need for ecological redundancy to main-
tain ecosystem processes (Peterson et al. 1998), and the
manner in which species richness scales with habitat area
(Rosenzweig 1995)).
Under “biobanking” or “vegetation offset” approaches,
proponents of a development involving clearance or al-
teration to vegetation are required to identify an offset of
an equivalent or better biodiversity value, assessed using
a biodiversity value metric (see discussion of metrics
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below). Two types of offsets are commonly identified un-
der such schemes: the regeneration of vegetation in areas
that are currently highly degraded, and the securing (of-
ten through tenure change) of vegetation in equivalent
or better condition (compared to the liquidated asset).
An assumption of such schema is that improved man-
agement and security of existing vegetation is an accept-
able offset for permanent loss of existing habitat because
it may provide future improvements to net biodiversity
value or avoid future losses. While we agree in principle
with the use of offsetting and biobanking as instruments
to conserve biodiversity, most offsetting schemes that use
these two approaches are resulting in net losses of biodi-
versity. We recommend instead policies that are likely to
provide net benefits for biodiversity.
Using existing assets as offsets will
deplete biodiversity
Trading schemes that allow vegetation clearance to be off-
set by protection of existing vegetation will result in a net
loss of habitat (Figure 1). In the best-case scenario, when
the offset is protected in perpetuity and maintained so
Figure 1 Trading existing ecological assets: B is selected as an offset
to the development of A. In the best-case scenario, B is maintained well
and improves slightly over time, but there is still a net loss of habitat.
In the worst-case scenario, the protection provided is inadequate over
time to prevent the loss of B through degradation or future development.
Increasing error bars over time result from increasing uncertainty about
the state of patch B at future time periods due to uncertainty about future
environmental and political conditions.
that its habitat value improves over time (i.e., its species
composition and structure is closer to some reference
state or condition; Gibbons et al. 2008), there is still a
net loss of habitat. In the worst-case scenario, the pro-
tection is inadequate to prevent the further loss of veg-
etation through degradation or future development of
offsets, leading to even greater losses of habitat in the
landscape.
One could argue that offsets based on the protection
of existing habitat do benefit biodiversity conservation as
they “protect” this habitat from future loss. This is based
on the assumption that the habitat used as the offset
is under some real threat of clearance either now or in
the future. This may be true in some instances, although
basing offset policy on the premise that existing vegeta-
tion (and therefore offsets themselves) cannot be truly
secured effectively admits defeat from the outset. An ef-
fective net-gain policy would ensure that future losses,
if unavoidable, would themselves be offset, making the
concept of tenure security as an offset redundant. If the
objective of a vegetation management policy is to achieve
no net loss, then actions that merely place offsets into a
different tenure or security arrangement should not be
permitted.
Uncertainty precludes lending as a
net-gain option
Many habitat trading schemes assume that we are capa-
ble of recreating habitat and that it will automatically be
used by biodiversity, while others penalize future offsets
arising from restoration based on the premise that they
are unlikely ever to substitute fully the character and
function of the lost vegetation (Victorian Government
2002; Moilanen et al. 2008). Unlike a building that can
be retrofitted for sustainability, once habitat is destroyed
it might be impossible to reconstruct. Revegetation and
restoration can increase tree cover and create habitat for
some species. However, to date recreation of ecosystems
with all component species and functions has proved pro-
hibitively expensive or impossible (Wilkins et al. 2003).
Assessments of revegetation success point to the fact that
it is difficult to create habitat for some key elements of
biodiversity (Hynes et al. 2004; Cunningham et al. 2007),
making it critical that areas of rare ecosystems are not
destroyed.
Furthermore, the population dynamics of species must
be incorporated into decision making, particularly for
those species sensitive to time lags between vegeta-
tion clearance and restoration (Gibbons & Lindenmayer
2007). Figure 2 demonstrates the potential loss of habitat
given uncertainty in restoration success. In the best-case
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Figure 2 Uncertainty in restoration: B is revegetated as an offset to the
development of A. In the best-case scenario, assuming perfect restoration
success, there is a time lag in the availability of habitat. In the worst-case
scenario, vegetation is never restored to the same condition as A, and
there is a net loss of habitat in the landscape. Error bars increase over time
due to uncertainty about future environmental and political conditions.
scenario, assuming perfect restoration success, there is
still a time lag in the availability of habitat during which
populations can drop below a minimum viable popula-
tion size (Shaffer 1981). In the worst-case scenario, habi-
tat is never fully restored; there is a net loss of habitat in
the landscape, and the probability that dependent species
persist in the landscape is likely to decline (Morris et al.
2006; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007).
Uncertainty penalties have been proposed (Moilanen
et al. 2008), whereby trading systems allow for ecologi-
cal uncertainties by offsetting loss of a given area with a
much greater area of vegetation restored/conserved. This
is equivalent in economics, to applying a discount rate
to calculate net present value. However, the uncertain-
ties associated with biodiversity value of restored sites is
such that the multipliers applied to offsets are difficult to
compute and are likely to be unworkably large (Moilanen
et al. 2008). Uncertainty multiplier systems are at best
complicated and unworkable in the eyes of proponents
and are at worst token and not commensurate with
the inherent uncertainty about restoration success. We
contend that the inherent difficulties in the use of un-
certainty multipliers adds to the weight of our argu-
ments for abandoning lending bank practices in favor of
a savings bank approach. This means that the biodiver-
sity value of offsets should be realized before assets are
liquidated.
The future of biodiversity banking: the
biodiversity savings bank
Biodiversity banking and offsetting of habitat loss are
good ideas that should not be abandoned. However, we
propose that the only workable and equitable system is
one in which assets are banked for the future and trad-
ing is only possible once it can be demonstrated that as-
sets have matured (reached ecological equivalence with
whatever losses they are being traded against). The value
of biodiversity assets (savings) should be demonstrated
before they can be used to offset loss of biodiversity else-
where. New investments could be sold to a party inter-
ested in liquidating an equivalent amount and quality of
vegetation. Alternatively, banked biodiversity (i.e., habi-
tat created above and beyond “duty of care” (Bryan et al.
2005)), could be bought or sold on an established mar-
ket. The definition of duty of care in this instance would
include the land management actions required of land-
holders under national, state and local laws, such as erad-
ication of proclaimed weeds and pests. To ensure that on
average the environment is better off after each trade, un-
certainties would be estimated, and trade allowed when
the evidence for the expected environmental benefits is
beyond reasonable doubt.
Figure 3 shows how a biodiversity savings bank would
operate. Habitat would be restored at a site and trade
would be allowed when the destruction of vegetation
(A) had only a small chance of taking the environment
below the original amount of habitat in the landscape.
Care would need to be taken to ensure that credit is only
assigned to actions that are above and beyond duty of
care or existing legislative requirements. An auditing sys-
tem would need to be established to ensure that genuine
restoration projects receive due recognition and appropri-
ate accrual of biodiversity credits.
Offsetting policies should be transparent in their objec-
tives by identifying a set of ecological attributes that habi-
tat trading aims to maintain or improve. The use of ob-
jectives such as “net gain” would need to be defined and
assessed in terms of these ecological attributes, for exam-
ple “net gain in the persistence of species in the landscape
and the extent and condition of their habitat.” For the
sake of accountability, monitoring systems would need
to be established to measure whether objectives are being
met. The burden of demonstrating the ongoing success of
restoration projects should be borne by the proponent of
the trade. The advantage of the savings bank approach is
that the equity of a trade or offset can be known (within
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Figure 3 The biodiversity bank as a savings bank: Vegetation is restored
at site B and trade is only allowed when we are conﬁdent that the de-
struction of A has only a very small chance of taking us below the original
amount of habitat in the landscape. Error bars reﬂect uncertainty about
the whether or not restoration is likely to be successful (from the perspec-
tive of someone at time = 0). However, uncertainty at the time of trade
under the savings bank model would be much less.
measurement error) at the time of the trade. The ongoing
responsibility to demonstrate that the offset is maintain-
ing or improving in quality would sit with the proponent,
although a statutory body would be responsible for audit-
ing the monitoring results.
Some things, such as critical habitat for listed threat-
ened species, are not tradeable. Offsetting is not a panacea
for unbridled development and must be firmly estab-
lished as the last and most costly step of the “avoid,
mitigate, and compensate” hierarchy from the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (UNEP 1992). The primacy
of avoiding clearance advocated in the convention must
be backed up by management systems and strong legisla-
tion to prevent clearing of habitat for endangered species.
There are many instances in which development has pro-
ceeded despite the presence of listed threatened species
on a site. Blundell (2006) describes a situation whereby a
mining company clears some of the last remaining 3% of
Peruvian Polylepis forest, home to several endangered bird
species, but achieves a “net gain” through protection and
restoration of other extant remnants. A similar proposal
has been put forward by the Victorian State Government
in Australia (Victorian Government 2009), which aims
to offset the destruction of several thousand hectares of
critically endangered (Environment Protection and Bio-
diversity Conservation Act 1999) basalt plains grasslands
(less than 1% pre-European extent; Barlow & Ross 2001)
by assigning a portion of the existing grassland to re-
serve. Offsetting in these instances cannot be used as a
substitute for responsible management; some elements of
biodiversity, like whole species and ecosystems, are irre-
placeable, hence should be untradeable if the trade adds
to an already high risk of extinction or loss.
In the following three sections, we expand on some key
aspects of a workable and equitable biodiversity savings
bank. We then address some of the likely objections to
the savings bank proposal and conclude with a summary
of the key argument in favor of such an arrangement.
Currency of trade must reﬂect ecological
realities
Moving from a lending bank to a savings bank approach
to biodiversity banking does not obviate the need for met-
rics to assess biodiversity value because the value of offset
sites, once restored, must be demonstrably equivalent to
those lost. In order to achieve equity between biodiversity
losses and offsets with high confidence, metrics that bet-
ter reflect the value of vegetation for biodiversity are re-
quired. Simple rules of thumb enable quick assessments,
but are unlikely to capture the real value for biodiversity
(McCarthy et al. 2004). Attempting to trade for “ecolog-
ical equivalence” is an intuitive notion, but the term is
not yet defined technically in a way that is appropriate
for biodiversity trading.
Metrics must incorporate irreplaceability (Pressey et al.
1994) to avoid the trap of allocating low value to de-
graded habitat even if it is representative of a highly
threatened ecological community. Some schemes use a
separate overlay or policy mechanism to ensure that the
most threatened communities or species habitats are not
traded. However, decisions about offsetting that rely on
habitat condition metrics alone will jeopardize many of
the most threatened ecosystems, as they often exist in
a degraded state (Prober & Thiele 1995). Figure 4 rep-
resents the problem of decreasing diversity of ecosys-
tems in a landscape resulting from trading vegetation on
the basis of quality, without considering irreplaceability.
Fragmented and degraded threatened ecosystems are sys-
tematically lost over time, and restoration efforts tend to
recreate more common ecosystems with a different value
to biodiversity (Ryan 2002).
Metrics must reflect the dynamic nature of landscapes.
For example, recently burned patches should not receive
an artificially low value because they temporarily lack
certain habitat characteristics. Areas that have been re-
cently disturbed can be important for biodiversity (Higgs
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Figure 4 Irreplaceability:When the currency of trade is habitat condition,
fragmented and degraded threatened ecosystems (A) are systematically
lost over time. Offsetting through restoration (B) tends to recreate more
common ecosystems. Over time, even though the amount of vegetation
may increase, the diversity of ecosystems in the landscape, and hence the
value of the landscape for biodiversity, declines.
& Fox 1993) and these naturally disturbed, early succes-
sional habitats can be rare in some landscapes (DellaSala
et al. 2006). In landscapes where this is the case, the de-
sired reference state (sensu Gibbons et al. 2008) need not
necessarily be the oldest or most ecological mature ver-
sion of the ecosystem.
The value of an offset will depend on the value of
surrounding vegetation, so spatial context must be con-
sidered both in the valuation and planning of offsets
(Bruggeman et al. 2005). Patches can be important for
metapopulation dynamics and retaining landscape con-
nectivity, as well as for their local attributes. For example,
planning proposals in urban Sydney, Australia (Growth
Centres Commission 2007) suggest that “net gain” in veg-
etation can be achieved through sacrificing most vegeta-
tion within an urban growth corridor so long as vege-
tation is protected and restored elsewhere in the State
of New South Wales. This assumes unrealistically that
equivalent vegetation can be found elsewhere, and has
further implications in terms of the connectivity of the
landscape and the metapopulation dynamics and genetic
diversity of species. Furthermore, this approach will lead
to an increasing separation between people and nature
and a reduction in the provision of local ecosystem ser-
vices to local communities (Tratalosa et al. 2007).
Responsibility for protecting and
maintaining offsets must be identiﬁed
Responsibilities and funding must be established prior
to project approval to ensure that offsets are managed,
protected, and monitored. Under the “Net Gain” scheme
in Victoria, Australia, security of the offsets is ensured
by alteration to the land title that guard against future
clearing. However, management contracts to maintain
the quality of the vegetation are generally undertaken
on relatively short time horizons (e.g., 10 years), making
the long-term condition of the offset uncertain. Wetland
offsets in the United States are rarely visited to ensure
that required mitigation is completed, and monitoring re-
ports are rarely filed (Esty 2007). Without commitments
to maintain and protect vegetation offsets through con-
servation covenants or other such schemes, these policies
will result in a net loss of vegetation over time. Alterna-
tively, offsets could be available for future development
if a sophisticated landscape accounting scheme was es-
tablished, but this solution has two potential problems:
(1) many criteria would need to be satisfied for a scheme
of this kind to achieve benefits for biodiversity, and the
sophistication in management that would be required
would depend on adequately resourced management
agencies with secure long-term funding, and (2) the need
for complex government regulation defeats the purpose
of establishing market-based approaches to natural re-
source management (Mansfield 2004).
Implementation of biodiversity offset
schemes must be closely regulated and
legally enforceable
Many current offsetting initiatives provide guidance as
to what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate offsets.
For example, guidance for the implementation of offset-
ting under the “Net-Gain” policy in Victoria, Australia
specifies that vegetation types listed as threatened, vul-
nerable or rare should not be offset within the policy
framework. However, such values are planned to be liq-
uidated by the Victorian Government itself for housing
development and “offset” by increasing tenure security
in another area (Victorian Government 2009). This is pri-
marily due to an inconsistent approach to implementing
the policy’s guiding principles. To avoid these types of in-
consistencies, offsetting schemes should be overseen by
an independent authority such as the relevant environ-
ment protection agencies (e.g., U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency) with the power to reject proposals that
breach fundamental criteria. In addition, for the prin-
ciples of even the most ecological defensible offsetting
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scheme to be respected by proponents of vegetation clear-
ance, they must be attached to a regulatory framework
that is legally enforceable and that provides sufficiently
serious penalties as a disincentive to noncompliance. Reg-
ulatory agencies must ensure that appropriate technical
expertise and resources exist so that those bodies respon-
sible for planning, implementing, and overseeing offset-
ting (e.g., state and local governments) are able to do so
in a rigorous and ecologically defensible way.
Arguments against the biodiversity
savings bank
Some may argue that it is impractical to expect devel-
opers or other parties to invest in revegetation now for
expected gain once the vegetation has reached an equiv-
alent ecological condition to that which is to be lost. This
is in part due to the length of time associated with ecolog-
ical restoration. However, we believe that there are some
mitigating factors. To improve the practicality of the bio-
diversity savings bank scheme, the rules of the bank could
allow credits to be assigned to people who have previ-
ously invested in restoration projects that might already
be providing some biodiversity benefit that could be im-
mediately tradeable (with the caveat that this restoration
must not have been undertaken as part of an existing off-
set scheme). This would place a premium value on bio-
diversity restoration investments have already reached a
high biodiversity value, rewarding those who have al-
ready made an attempt to revegetate.
In order to increase the area of land available for offset-
ting, other investment initiatives such as carbon trading
should be harnessed as a source of funds for investments
in biodiversity restoration (Bekessy & Wintle 2008; van
Oosterzee et al. 2010). Integration of the biodiversity bank
with the carbon bank will increase the potential for im-
proved biodiversity outcomes. We believe that allowing
investors to double dip (initially, at least) in the carbon
and biodiversity banks (i.e., to accrue both carbon and
biodiversity credits from one restored parcel of land) will
favor biodiverse carbon sequestration investments over
biodiversity poor carbon sequestration investments (e.g.,
monoculture plantations) (see Bekessy & Wintle 2008 for
details).
Some vegetation types (e.g., grasslands) will take less
time to restore and revegetate than others. This may have
the effect of encouraging proponents of vegetation clear-
ance to avoid the destruction of ecosystems that are ex-
tremely difficult to regenerate/reconstruct and/or to seek
investment in restoration of some vegetation types that
are faster to restore. However, it is necessary to ensure
that different vegetation types are not substitutable, so
that the loss of one vegetation type cannot be offset with
credits obtained from the restoration of another. Simi-
larly, metrics that combine different elements of habitat
(e.g., tree cover, weeds, coarse woody debris, etc.) should
not be constructed in such a way that allows the differ-
ent elements to be perfectly substitutable (as allowed by
additive metrics). Otherwise the elements that are more
difficult to conserve or restore will continue to decline,
offset by the growth of the cheaper elements (McCarthy
et al. 2004).
A biodiversity savings bank would be substantially sim-
pler to administer than the current system that allows off-
setting with future, uncertain benefits. Under current ap-
proach to offsetting, society bears the risk of failure. To
ameliorate partly this risk, uncertainty penalties are of-
ten applied to offsets whereby the area and condition of
the offset is larger than the loss. In ecology, the uncer-
tainties are so large that a consistent and equitable dis-
count rate will make many trades unworkable for propo-
nents (Moilanen et al. 2008). Thus, the savings bank that
we recommend has considerable value for both propo-
nents of development and for those whose primary moti-
vation is to protect the environment because it simplifies
the process, removing the complexity and ambiguity of
uncertainty penalties. A savings bank will provide a plat-
form for equitable trades where uncertainty does not un-
reasonably inflate the expected magnitude and condition
of the region that has to be rehabilitated. The value for
the environment is that net gain is assured.
Finally, critics of a savings bank approach to biodiver-
sity banking and offsetting need to consider the alter-
natives. On the one hand, there is maintenance of sta-
tus quo (offsets based on uncertain future benefits from
restoration), which is likely to lead to further biodiversity
losses. On the other hand, relying on regulation alone is
risky given the continued loss of vegetation in places with
apparently strong regulation. While biobanking should
not be seen as a substitute for good vegetation manage-
ment regulations, the biobank will, if handled correctly,
bring additive benefits over and above the regulatory
minima.
Conclusion
We believe that biodiversity banking and offsetting
schemes should be encouraged as an approach to achiev-
ing better biodiversity outcomes in the face of increas-
ing human pressure on the environment. However, their
purpose is dubious if they fail to deliver real benefits for
biodiversity and could in effect reduce pressure on de-
velopers to avoid harm (Roberts 1993). In many parts
of the world, the loss of habitat below levels necessary
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for viable populations of flora and fauna (also known as
“the extinction debt”) (Malanson 2008; Hahs et al. 2009)
means that we need genuine “net gain” outcomes un-
less we are prepared to accept responsibility for further
extinctions. Current implementation of biodiversity off-
setting could be considered a lending approach, whereby
loss of biodiversity assets is offset by possible future gains.
This approach is unacceptable because the environment
and public own all the risk of failure. We believe that a
saving bank approach is the only practical and equitable
approach for biobanking.
Implementing a savings bank approach to biobanking
will not be easy and will require strong political will and
a concerted cooperative effort by scientists, policy mak-
ers and managers to get the details right. However, we
cannot continue to use current approaches to offsetting
to claim that we are adequately mitigating threats to bio-
diversity, because this is simply an untenable claim. The
biobank should be a savings bank, or it should not exist
at all.
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